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Government Intrusion: An Eligibility
Requirement of AFDC
I. Introduction
Aid to Families with Dependent Children' is a system of "coopera-
tive federalism" 2 designed to provide public assistance to a category of
needy children. 3 Section 401 of the Social Security Act 4 sets forth the
purpose of AFDC: to encourage the care of children in their own homes.
This objective is to be implemented by enabling states to furnish financial
assistance and rehabilitation to dependent children and their parents in
order to maintain and strengthen family life and help the children and
their parents attain self support and personal independence. 5 In reviewing
the state and federal laws designed to reach these goals, one overriding
eligibility requirement becomes apparent. In return for its help, the
government demands the submission of the AFDC recipient to extensive
government inquiry about himself, his family and his home. The recipient
must, therefore, be willing to endure substantial government interference.
I. The controlling federal law is a subchapter of the Social Security Act, 3§ 401-44, 42
U.S.C. §3 601-44 (1970 & Supp. 1975), and the regulations authorized under the Act, 45
C.F.R. §§ 201, 204-06, 213, 220, 224-26, 228, 232-35, 237, 302; 42 C.F.R. § 205; 29 C.F.R. 3§
56-58 (1976) (hereinafter referred to as AFDC].
In Pennsylvania, the AFDC administration plan is set forth in the Public Welfare Code,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, §§ 401-1503 (Purdon 1968 & Supp. 1977), and in regulations and
memoranda contained in the PUBLIC ASSISTANCE MANUAL §§ 1100-8330 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as P. A. MAN.]
The basic requirements for state plans are set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1970 & Supp.
1975).
2. Doe v. Beal, 523 F.2d 611, 616 (3rd Cir. 1975). "Provision for the economic
security of children was made by offering substantial federal funds to states submitting
plans complying with the Act and HEW regulations." Mandley v. Trainor, 523 F.2d 415,417
(7th Cir. 1975).
3. Section 406(a) of the Social Security Act defines "dependent child" as a needy
child
(1) who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason of the death,
continued absence from the home, or physical or mental incapacity of a parent,
and who is living with his father, mother, grandfather, grandmother, brother,
sister, stepfather, stepmother, stepbrother, stepsister, uncle, aunt, first cousin,
nephew, or niece, in a place of residence maintained by one or more of such
relatives as his or their own home, and (2) who is (A) under the age of eighteen, or
(B) under the age of twenty-one and . . . a student regularly attending a school,
college, or university, or regularly attending a course of vocational or technical
training designed to fit him for gainful employment . . ..
42 U.S.C. § 606 (1970 & Supp. 1975). Section 407 of the Act was amended in 1968 and
redefined "dependent child" to include one deprived by reason of the father's
unemployment.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1970).
5. Id.
In some instances the law mandates direct6 governmental intrusion
into the individual's family life, while in others it indirectly 7 affects the
recipient. In either case, government interference necessarily creates a
dependency on government.' The intent of this note is to survey relevant
federal and Pennsylvania laws to show the kinds of indirect and direct
government intervention imposed as conditions of eligibility for AFDC.
II. Direct Government Interference
A. Support
As a condition of eligibility the Social Security Act mandates that
the recipient assign to the state any rights to child support. 9 The recipient
must further cooperate with the state in establishing the paternity of an
illegitimate child for the purpose of obtaining support payments.' 0 The
recipient is excused from cooperating only if she can show "good cause"
for refusing.''
1. Proposed Federal Regulations.-Under the proposed regula-
tions of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare,' 2 the recipient
shall be determined to have "good cause"' 13 only if cooperation would be
"against the best interests of the child." 14 The major justification for
refusal is that the recipient's cooperation would result in substantial
danger, physical harm, or undue harassment to the child or the caretaker
relative.' 5 Other "best interest" exceptions include when the child was
conceived as a result of forcible rape 16 or incest' 7 or when an adoption is
pending. 18
The exceptions are reasonable and humane, but the burden of proof
is not. The proposed regulations unduly restrict the recipient's ability to
show one of the excepted circumstances. The evidence submitted must
establish a prima facie case. 19 This is made difficult, however, by the fact
that the recipient must be able to produce police records, medical reports,
social services reports or court documents to substantiate her claims.
20
6. See notes 9 to 108 and accompanying text infra.
7. See notes 109 to 124 and accompanying text infra.
8. See generally Note, Rehabilitation, Investigation, and the Welfare Home Visit, 79
YALE L.J.. 746, 756-61 (1970).
9. Section 402(a) (26) (A)&(B), 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (26)(A)&(B) (Supp. 1975); 45
C.F.R. §§ 232.12 to .30 & 302.31 (1976).
10. Id.
11. Section 402(a)(26)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(26)(B) (Supp. 1975).
12. 41 Fed. Reg. 34298-34301 (1976).
13. 41 Fed. Reg. 34300-301 (1976) (to be codified in 45 C.F.R. § 232.13).
14. Id.
15. Id. §232.13(d)(1).
16. Id. § 232.13(d)(2).
17. Id.
18. Id. § 232.13(d)(3).
19. Id. §232.13(f)(1).
20. Id. § 232.13(g)(1)-(5).
The evidentiary restrictions seem to be based on the questionable
presumption that past acts of violence have been reported. No specific
provision is made, therefore, for oral testimony from the recipient or her
friends 21 as to acts of violence or rape. Thus, the prospective recipient
who fails to establish a prima facie case is placed in the difficult position
of deciding whether the benefits of AFDC assistance outweigh the poten-
tial danger or humiliation of establishing paternity. The risk involved in
choosing the welfare benefits places an unfair emotional strain on the
recipient and is counterproductive to strengthening family life.
2. Pennsylvania Regulations.-The recently promulgated regula-
tions of the Department of Public Welfare (DPW)22 regarding coopera-
tion23 in support and paternity actions do not incorporate the expanded
"best interest" provisions of the proposed federal regulations. Instead,
the "best interest" exception is limited to paternity actions after the
recipient has assigned her support rights to DPW.24 The Pennsylvania
regulations excuse cooperation only when rape, incest, or pending legal
proceedings for adoption are involved.2" Thus the mother may have to
submit herself to physical danger as a condition of eligibility for AFDC.
It is again impossible to reconcile this requirement with AFDC's stated
purpose, which is to strengthen family life.26
B. Property Rights
Stated simply the computation of a grant in AFDC is made by adding
together a grant group's earned and unearned income and resources and
subtracting that figure from the monthly family allowance. 27 If non-
exempt income and resources are greater than the monthly allowance,
then the family is ineligible because it fails to meet the need
requirement. 28
21. Section 232.13(g)(6) is a catchall provision and gives HEW the discretion to permit
such other elements as it may determine constitute acceptable evidence. This provision does
not guarantee that the state will permit oral statements by the applicant or corroborating oral
statements by another witness. This seems particularly restrictive in rape cases because
many rapes are not reported.
22. 7 Pa. Bull. 580 (1977).
23. Under 7 Pa. Bull. 584 (1977) (to be codified in P.A. MAN. § 3237.211) cooperation
includes the following: (1) appearing at the offices of the local and/or Domestic Relations
Office as necessary to provide verbal and written information and signing legal forms
required to file petitions for support, (2) appearing as a witness in court proceedings
necessary to obtain support, (3) giving support payments to the Claim Settlement Child
Support Agency.
The inconvenience to the applicant apparent in this regulation is illustrative of the
unnecessary government intrusion connected with receiving welfare. The applicant is
forced to provide the same information to three separate sources-the income maintenance
worker, the Claims Settlement Officer, and the Domestic Relations Officer.
24. 7 Pa. Bull. 585 (1977) (to be codified in P.A. MAN. § 3237.212).
25. Id.
26. Social Security Act, § 401, 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1970).
27. P.A. MAN. § 3200.
28. Id. In Cumberland County the allowance for a family of four is $350. In Dauphin
County the allowance is $354. Id. § 3260.
In determining an applicant's need the state disregards certain per-
sonal property,29 exempts other personal property30 and disregards the
recipient's home. 31 Any non-exempt personal property and the appli-
cant's residence are secured by Pennsylvania to repay assistance be-
nefits. 32 The conditions imposed by the applicant's acknowledgement of
liability would be considered onerous if imposed upon a poor person by a
private lender.
1. Intrusion upon Real Property Rights.-The AFDC recipient
may own his home; he is not required to liquidate that asset. 33 He is,
however, required to acknowledge liability by signing a reimbursement
agreement that contains a confession of judgment clause.3 4 If the
homeowner is forced to sell because of urban renewal he frequently
cannot obtain a mortgage to buy another home, and the state takes its lien
out of the proceeds of the sale. 35 Even if the homeowner wishes to
dispose of his home voluntarily he cannot buy or sell without the DPW's
permission. 36 If he does sell, the recipient may be forced to repay all or
part of the lien. 37 Finally, if the recipient undertakes to make major
repairs he cannot obtain financing because the presence of a lien on a
credit report discourages financial institutions from extending credit.38
29. The following personal property does not represent a resource to the AFDC client
and is discregarded in determing eligibility: (1) wedding and engagement rings, family
heirlooms, clothing and children's toys; (2) household furnishings, personal effects, and
items used to provide, equip, and maintain a household for the applicant or recipient; (3)
equipment and material that are necessary to implement employment, rehabilitation, or
self-care plan for the client; (4) motor vehicles; (5) retroactive assistance payments received
as a result of a Fair Hearing decision; and (6) retroactive assistance payments authorized to
correct underpayments to current recipients. 5 Pa. Legis. Serv. 495 (Purdon 1976) (to be
codified in PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 432.5); 7 Pa. Bull. 603 (1977) (to codified in P.A. MAN. §
3236.11).
30. The following personal property is exempt to meet current and future needs while
uninterrupted assistance is received:
(1) Savings of a school child up to $2,000 for each child.
(2) Cash value of life insurance up to $1,000 for each individual.
(3) Other personal property in the combined amount of $250 for one person in
the assistance unit, plus $100 for each additional person. Such personal
property includes cash on hand, stocks, bonds, mortgages, life insurance in
excess of $1,000 for each individual, and savings of a school child in excess
of $2,000 for each child.
The total amount of all the above exempt personal property, together
with income exempt by the State (§ 3232.212) cannot exceed $12,000 for each
individual client (see § 3231) (paraphrased).
5 Pa. Legis. Serv. 495 (Purdon 1976) (to be codified in PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 432.5); 7 Pa.
Bull. 603 (1977) (to be codified in P.A. MAN., § 3236.12).
31. 5 Pa. Legis. Serv. 495 (Purdon 1976) (to be codified in PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, §
432.5); 7 Pa. Bull. 603 (1977) (to be codified in P.A. MAN. § 3236.12).
32. 5 Pa. Legis. Serv. 495 (Purdon 1976) (to be codified in PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, §
432.5); 7 Pa. Bull. 602-03 (1977) (to be codified in P.A. MAN. §§ 3235, 3236).
33. 5 Pa. Legis. Serv. 495 (Purdon 1976) (to be codified in PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, §
432.5); 7 Pa. Bull. 602 (1977) (to be codified in P.A. MAN. § 3235).
34. P.A. MAN. §§ 3822.1, 3822.2, 3826.5.
35. Charleston v. Wohlgemuth, 332 F. Supp. 1175, 1179 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 405
U.S. 970 (1972).
36. Id. at 1180.
37. P.A. MAN. § 3821.2.
38. Charleston v. Wohlgemuth, 332 F. Supp. 1175, 1180 (E.D. Pa. 1971). The court
The economic hardships imposed by the government creditor undermine
the self-sufficiency AFDC is attempting to re-establish by forcing the
recipient into greater dependence on the state.
In the process of protecting public funds with confession of judg-
ment provisions the government deprives AFDC recipients of rights to
which they would be entitled if they were contracting with a private party.
Although no disclaimer of the confession of judgment provision is ex-
plicitly set forth in the Public Welfare Code or Public Assistance Manual,
the court in Charleston v. Wohlgemuth39 characterized the lien as a
dormant security lien4' constitutionally permissible under Snell v. Wy-
man.4 Consequently, in Pennsylvania confession of judgment provisions
are unconstitutional when applied to private debtors earning less than
$10,000 in the absence of showing a knowing waiver,42 but under
Charleston4 3 are constitutional when applied to AFDC recipients. This
disparity is illogical and difficult to reconcile with the AFDC purpose of
assuring the recipient's independence.
2. Interference with Personal Property .- The procedures dealing
with the applicant's personal property are similar. Non-exempt personal
property that is immediately convertible into cash is considered available
to meet current living expenses. 44 After the conversion the applicant may
or may not qualify for a monthly allowance. 45 In order to retain any
non-exempt personal property which cannot be immediately converted
into cash the applicant must acknowledge liability to the government
46
and take immediate steps to offer such property on sale on the open
market. 47 No provision is made for refusing to sell immediately because
of a depressed market.
rejected the recipient's hardship argument because of the regulations that permit the
postponement and subordination of the state's lien. P.A. MAN. §§ 3826.54, 3826.8. The court
suggested, however, that the Commonwealth embark on a program of remedial action in
cooperation with lending institutions supplemented by a program to better inform recipients
of the subordination regulations. Id. at 1180.
39. 332 F. Supp. 1175 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
40. Id. at 1186.
41. 393 U.S. 323 (1969). The Supreme Court stated that the failure to accede to New
York's claim for a dormant security lien and reimbursement was a legitimate justification
for AFDC disqualification.
42. Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 407 U.S. 104 (1972).
43. 332 F. Supp. 1175 (E.D. Pa. 1971). The court distinguished Swarb v. Lennox
because the Department of Welfare has a policy of proving its claim in any proceeding by
the debtor-assistance recipient to open judgment. That policy is not stated in the Public
Assistance Manual or in Public Welfare Code.
44. 5 Pa. Legis. Serv. 495 (Purdon 1976) (to be codified in PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, §
432.5(e)).
45. If the cash received, excluding the allowed exemptions (See note 30 supra)
together with other resources and income exceed the monthly family allowance, the recip-
ient or applicant would not qualify.
46. P.A. MAN. § 3821.2 sets forth the types of personal property liable for reimburse-
ment and the acknowledgement of liability that is required.
47. P.A. MAN. § 3236 states that the applicant must convert "at whatever price the
property brings when it is offered for sale on the open market."
The required acknowledgment of liability as to assignable and non-
assignable personal property deprives the recipient of significant rights.
The recipient must either sign and turn over to DPW the document that is
evidence of ownership48 or sign an "agreement to pay claim." 4 9 Under
the latter he subjects himself to the following conditions: (1) judgment
can be taken with declaration; (2) the cost of the suit may be added to the
judgment; (3) no objections may be raised to technical errors made by
DPW; (4) the posting of security to prevent sale is waived: (5) the
assertion of rights under any appraisement, stay or execution law, includ-
ing debtor exemption law is prohibited. 50 The government has once again
used its unequal bargaining power to strip the recipient of legal rights and
requires him to enter into an adhesion contract in order to receive
benefits.
3. Government Restraints on Alienation.-Dependency on the
government is furthered by the regulations controlling the transfer of any
of the recipient's real and personal property subject to reimbursement. 51
The recipient can no longer make an independent decision to sell proper-
ty; instead he must obtain approval from the Department of Welfare. This
request for approval triggers a mandatory investigation of the transaction
by the County Office 52 and a discretionary investigation by the Claims
Settlement Area Office.
53
The Pennsylvania regulations also mandate government approval of
transfers of property valued at five hundred dollars or more within two
years prior to application. 54 The state must find fair consideration or an
explicitly stated substitute 55 before the applicant can establish eligibility.
C. Personal and Familial Privacy
In addition to the state's direct interference with a recipient's proper-
ty rights, there is a requirement that the individual submit to direct
government scrutiny and relinquish to the state his freedom to make
certain decisions. These eligibility requirements are obviously designed
to further the rehabilitative goals of AFDC.
48. P.A. MAN. § 3822.22.
49. Id. § 3822.23. Resources not assignable include alimony payments, delayed
wages, estates of deceased recipients, goods, chattels, auto, antiques, cash from insurance
adjustment, retirement benefits, damage claims, support order payments, and workmen's
compensation.
50. P.A. MAN. § 3822.232.
51. P.A. MAN. § 3232.2 Reimbursement is the repayment of assistance granted to a
person or certain of his relatives while he has ownership or the right to ownership of
property. The list of properties liable is set forth in P.A. MAN. § 3821.2.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. § 3232.1.
55. See id. §§ 3232.1, 3232.11 (definition of fair consideration and exceptions to fair
consideration requirements).
1. Case Studies.-The Social Security Act prescribes government
intervention when the state has reason to believe the home of a recipient is
unsuitable for the child "because of the neglect, abuse, or exploitation of
such child."56 The state has an affirmative duty to inform appropriate
court or law enforcement agencies of "unsuitable homes." 5 7
Pennsylvania implements its investigative responsibilities in the fol-
lowing manner. The first required interview is with an income mainte-
nance worker, who advises the prospective recipient of the services the
agency provides5 8 and makes an immediate referral to the Social Services
Unit if protective services for children or adults appear to be necessary."
Unless there appears to be imminent danger the client is not required to
see the social services caseworker until an initial cash grant is
authorized. 6°
The social services worker is required at the initial interview to make
a "social study and service plan''61 defining problems 62 affecting the
individual and the family. In assessing "parental functioning" the case-
worker evaluates whether the home is suitable for the child.63 In the
Public Assistance Manual the caseworker is directed to judge whether a
child's welfare may be jeopardized in terms of the following minimum
standards:
(1) Reasonably clean, sanitary home in good repair with
adequate space, heating and furnishings.
(2) Sufficient and proper food and clothing, appropriate
to the age and physical condition of the child.
(3) Appropriate physical care and treatment.
(4) Preventive and remedial medical care.
(5) Support of the child's interest and involvement in
school including adaptation to the demands of school
experience.
56. Section 401(a)(16), 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(16) (1970 & Supp. 1975).
57. Social Security Act. §§ 404(b), 408, 42 U.S.C. §§ 604(b), 608 (1970).
58. P.A. MAN. § 3572.1512.
59. Id. § 3572.153(b).
60. P.A. MAN. § 3572.153.
61. Id. § 3714.312.
62. The federal government prescribes services that must be provided for seventy-
five percent federal matching funds. The required services are outlined in P.A. MAN. § 3710
Appendix IIl. The problem areas that are deemed to require social services involve unmar-
ried parents and their children, families disrupted by desertion or impending desertion,
families with potentially employable adults, children in need of protection, and children with
special problems.
63. P.A. MAN. § 3710 Appendix I (a) defines what is unsuitable housing:
I. It is substandard if any of the following exist.
a. Has inadequate cooking, bathing and/or toilet facilities;
b. Has overcrowded sleeping arrangements with no separate sleeping space
for parents, older childredn of different sex or other adults;
c. Has inadequate storage space for food, household supplies and clothing;
d. Has inadequate heating and/or lighting equipment;
e. The property and/or equipment is in such condition that it endangers the
health and safety of the occupants.
2. It is so arranged that a person who has problems of mobility cannot cope with
daily physical needs.
3. It is so located that the lack of suitable transportation creates hardships in
seeking or retaining employment, securing medical care, shopping, recreation
or church attendance, etc.
(6) Satisfying family relationships.
(7) Moral training and guidance.
64
The caseworker's objective in scrutinizing these factors is to assist par-
ents in improving home conditions principally by referring them to social
service agencies that deal with that particular problem.
These standards are axiomatic and, consequently, vague. They pro-
vide the caseworker with broad discretion to determine the nature and
extent of the rehabilitation required, although there is no requirement that
the caseworker be trained either formally or informally 65 to exercise that
discretion wisely. Moreover, the standards provide the recipient with no
notice as to what is acceptable behavior and for what conduct he will be
disciplined. More importantly, the standards demand behavior by the
recipient that is not possible under current public assistance grants. The
federal proverty level for 1976 is $5,500, which is $1,180 more than the
public welfare grant for a family of four.66 Public welfare recipients now
live at sixty-one percent of the Bureau of Labor Statistics' "lower income
budget. "67 That budget reflects marginally adequate levels of health and
decency for a family of four. 68 Based on the inadequacy of the grant, the
recipient will be economically incapable of meeting the state's standards
of adequate care of the child.
In order to implement the minimum standards provision the Public
Assistance Manual directs the caseworker, when the parents are unable or
unwilling to take adequate measures to improve the situation, to refer the
matter to the agency carrying out the county's child care responsibilities
or to the Juvenile Probation Office.69 This directive is complemented by
section 2204 of the Child Protective Service Law,°70 which requires social
service workers to report suspected child abuse to the child protective
service. 
71
Thus the AFDC applicant must submit to government scrutiny of his
ability to function as a parent; this scrutiny has far-reaching implications.
A finding of neglect or abuse may trigger legal procedures that result in
the loss of custody of his child. Based on the standards7 2 set forth in the
64. P.A. MAN. § 3714.3121(3).
65. See Note, Rehabilitation, Investigation, and the Welfare Home Visit, 79 YALE
L.J. 746, 761 (1970).
66. Pennsylvania State Welfare Rights Organization, Why Welfare Grants Must Be
Increased (Jan. 1977) (unpublished report on file Pennsylvania Legal Services).
67. Id.
68. Health & Welfare Council, Inc., Health and Decency for Pennsylvania's Poor
(Dec. 14, 1973) (unpublished report on need for adequate income provision on file Pennsyl-
vania Legal Services).
69. P.A. MAN. § 3714.3121(31). The legal procedures related to neglect proceedings
are found under the "Juvenile Act," PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 50-101 to 50-337 (Purdon
Supp. 1976-77).
70. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. I1, § 2201-24 (Purdon Supp. 1976-77). A social worker who
willfully fails to report child abuse is guilty of a summary offense. A second or subsequent
offense shall be a misdemeanor of the third degree.
71. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 2204, 2212 (Purdon Supp. 1976-77).
72. PA. STAT. ANN. tit, I1, §§ 50-314 to 50-321 (Purdon Supp. 1976-77). In Doe v.
Beal, 523 F.2d 611, 634 (2d Cir. 1975), Judge Kalodner stated, "There are probably no
programs of the state or federal government affording financial assistance that do not
Public Assistance Manual, which seem vague and consequently capable
of multiple interpretations by caseworkers, the AFDC recipient who is
aware of the regulation must perceive child neglect or abuse proceedings
as a risk connected with public assistance.
2. Home Visits .- Required government intrusion does not end
with the two initial interviews. In Wyman v. James73 the Supreme Court
held that home visits, which Justice Blackmun has called "the heart of
the welfare administration," 74 do not fall under the fourth amendment
proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures. 75 Therefore, a
recipient's consent to a welfare official's entry into his home is a condi-
tion of continued eligibility.
7 6
In Pennsylvania redetermination of eligibility must occur at a
minimum of once every six months.77 Redetermination "contacts," usu-
ally through planned visits, are necessary to establish continued eligibili-
ty. The Public Assistance Manual provides for planned visits with a
significant exception:
Redetermination contacts with the client may be in the
home or in the office, depending on the client's preference.
Office and home visits are scheduled with the client. However,
it is not always possible to plan a visit; home visits to the client
without notice may on occasion be necessary.78
An unplanned visit is permissible when substantiating information is
urgently needed. 79 This exception, if liberally permitted, could complete-
ly abridge the client's minimal rights to privacy8" by making unplanned
home visits a condition of eligibility in Pennsylvania. 8 ' Although the
contain within them, sometimes unarticulated, norms of conduct that are prerequisite to
receiving the assistance."
Unfortunately, the welfare recipient's violation of the norm of care demanded is often
due to the inadequacy of the grant. See notes 66-68 and accompanying text supra.
73. 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
74. 400 U.S. 309, 320 (1971).
75. This decision is difficult to reconcile with Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S.
523 (1967), and See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967). Camera involved a refusal of
entry to city housing inspectors checking for a violation of a building's occupancy permit.
See involved a refusal of entry to a business establishment to a fire department representa-
tive inspecting for compliance with the fire code. In both cases, the Supreme Court held
warrantless searches to be violative of the fourth amendment.
76. It is significant to note that in Wyman Mrs. James was willing to supply all
information "reasonable and relevant" to her need for public assistance. She was merely
attempting to assert her right to refuse entry to her home. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309,
313 (1970).
77. P.A. MAN. § 3512.1
78. Id. § 3512.4 (emphasis added). See also P.A. MAN. § 3511.332 (suggesting that
notice of a visit should be given "whenever practical").
79. P.A. MAN. § 3512.4.
80. Under Wyman, of course, this is not a constitutionally protected right. See notes
74-76 and accompanying text supra.
81. Justice Douglas poses two questions that point to the Court's willingness to
enforce a stricter standard of "parenting" upon the welfare recipient:
Would the majority sanction, in the absence of probable cause, compulsory visits
to all American homes for the purpose of discovering child abuse? Or is this Court
prepared to hold as a matter of constitutional law that a mother, merely because
she is poor, is substantially more likely to injure or exploit her children?
Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 342 (1970) (dissenting opinion).
investigative aspects8 2 of the home visit may lead to prosecution for a
misdemeanor 83 or a felony84 or to civil forfeiture, 81 the home visit is not
considered a search within the ambit of the fourth amendment and the
caseworker need not, therefore, have probable cause to demand entry into
the recipient's home.
3. Disclosure.-In Pennsylvania, the AFDC recipient also risks
disclosure of his financial need to persons outside the County Assistance
Office. Under the "Right to Know Act"8 6 any adult resident who pro-
vides the name of a recipient of AFDC is entitled to be told that individu-
al's address and the amount be receives from public assistance.8 7 The
only restrictions placed on this right are that the information may not be
used for political or commercial purposes.
88
Caseworkers also have limited discretion to make collateral contacts
to verify the client's eligibility without obtaining his consent. The Public
Assistance Manual authorizes the caseworker to make such contacts
because of "unusual circumstances." ' 89 An example of an unusual cir-
cumstance in which such corroboration is permitted is "when the client
lives a considerable distance from the CAO, has no telephone and the
need to confirm a point of eligibility is urgent for the client's welfare."9
For each client and recipient of AFDC there is a case record file. The
case record is the Department of Welfare's official file of forms, corres-
pondence and other documents pertinent to the client's application and
eligibility. 9' The income maintenance worker has primary responsibility
for recording information on the eligibility forms, filing the forms,
maintaining the record and removing outdated materials.92
The client has no right of access to his case record file unless he
requests a fair hearing93 challenging a Department of Welfare action
refusing or discontinuing assistance. 9' If the client requests a fair hearing,
he or she is entitled to examine only that material from the case record
which the County Office will introduce as evidence to support its decision
or action.
95
82. Although welfare caseworkers seek to be friends, they are required to be sleuths.
Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 339 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
83. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2701 (Purdon 1973).
84. PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2702 (Purdon 1973).
85. See notes 69-70 supra.
86. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, §§ 66.1 to 66.4 (Purdon Supp. 1976-77).
87. McMullan v. Wohlgemuth, 453 Pa. 147, 308 A.2d 888 (1973) (dictum). But see 45
C.F.R. § 205.50 (1976). The regulations were published in November 10, 1975, after the
McMullan decision, and would seem to proscribe the disclosure of information permitted in
the case.
88. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 66.1(2) (Purdon Supp. 1976-77).
89. P.A. MAN. § 3511.335.
90. Id. Contacts without specific consent are to be kept to a minimum "consistent
with good judgment" and the circumstances involved are to be substantiated in the case
record.
91. P.A. MAN. §4110.
92. Id.
93. Id. § 3590.
94. Id. § 4143.3.
95. Id. § 3591(b).
Thus, the welfare recipient's right to privacy is not adequately
protected under the state plan. The recipient or applicant has a severely
limited right to know what records are being maintained or disseminated
and to gain access to collected information to correct or amend inac-
curacies or errors.
96
4. Protective Payments.-Protective payments, 97 which are insti-
tuted only when all rehabilitative efforts have failed, 98 deprive the recip-
ient of even the right to choose how to spend the cash granted to him by
the state. 99 They are mandated in three situations: (1) when it is deter-
mined by a caseworker that a client's inability to manage funds severely
affects his or his family's welfare;" (2) when a client refuses to partici-
pate in Work Incentive Program'0 ' or accept a bona fide offer of employ-
ment; 102 or (3) when a recipient is ineligible because of failure to cooper-
ate in securing support from a parent or establishing paternity.'
0 3
Government involvement intensifies following the imposition of
protective payments. Under section 3773 of the new state regulations a
Public Child Welfare Agency' 0 4 shall be the preferred protective
payee.' 0 5 This provision is a double-edged sword affecting the recipient's
privacy. Under current regulations governing protective payments, home
visits invariably increase, since redetermination of need for protective
payments is made as often as is indicated by the circumstances but no less
frequently than every three months. 1° Again, after these visits the
caseworker has an obligation to report any child abuse or neglect. 107 In
addition, section 3776 of the Public Assistance Manual creates a duty to
96. Compare the safeguards in disclosing information and granting access to the
affected individuals in section 4143 of the Public Assistance Manual with those safeguards
prescribed in the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (Supp. 1975).
The same confidentiality requirements and limitations to access by the individual
pertain to the Central Registry file on absent parents, P.A. Man. § 3122.4222. Again, there is
no provision for the absent parent when located to review the files in the Central Registry
and to expunge any erroneous material.
97. Protective payments of assistance are made to a third party to spend to meet the
needs of the recipient. P.A. MAN. § 3771.2.
98. Protective payments are imposed only after concentrated government interfer-
ence in the form of home visits, discussions with the caseworker, and discussions by the
caseworker with complaining creditors. P. A. MAN. §§ 3772.2 and 3714.3121(1)(B).
99. P.A. MAN. §3770.
100. Social Security Act, § 406(b)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 606(b)(2)(A) (1970); P.A. MAN. §
3772(b).
101. Commonly known as WIN, all AFDC applicants or recipients must register as a
condition of eligibility. The WIN program provides manpower services, training and em-
ployment. Social Security Act, §§ 430-44, 42 U.S.C. §§ 630-44 (1970).
102. Social Security Act, § 402(a)(19)(F), 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(19)(F) (1970 & Supp.
1975); P.A. MAN. § 3772(A).
103. Social Security Act, § 402(a)(26)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(26)(B) (1970 & Supp.
1975).
104. P.A. MAN. § 3773.1.
105. But see 45 C.F.R. § 234.60(7)(1), which provides in part:
Standards will be established for selection: (i) of protective payees, who are
interested in or concerned with the recipient's welfare, to act for the recipient in
receiving assistance, with the selection of a protective payee being made by the
recipient, or with his participation and consent, to the extent possible. (emphasis
added).
106. P.A. MAN. § 3776.
107. See notes 73-74 supra.
petition for removal of the children from the home, for custodial care for
the adult, or for appointment of a guardian if the caseworker feels that
protective payments will have to continue for more than two years. 108
III. Indirect Government Intrusions
The second type of government intrusion into the private lives of
AFDC recipients is more indirect, but no less invidious.
A. Maximum Grant
In AFDC programs, the state has the right to establish a maximum
family grant-an upper limit on the total amount of money any one
family unit may receive. 109 In Dandridge v. Williams "0 the recipients of
AFDC argued that Maryland's maximum grant conflicted with the Social
Security Act's mandate to provide assistance to all eligible individuals
and with its objective of keeping children in the family home."' They
also contended that the regulation violated equal protection by dis-
criminating against recipients with large families. The Court concluded
that the state's imposition of a maximum grant, although it might tend to
cause the disintegration of large families, was consistent with the Social
Security Act. 2 The Court explained that in order for the family to retain
assistance payments the child could not be sent away to anyone other than
a relative specified by law: "The kinship tie may be attenuated but it
cannot be destroyed.' ' 1 3 Further, citing cases regulating industry as
precedent, the court imposed a rational relationship standard to test for
unconstitutional discrimination between classification of welfare recip-
ients." 4 Under Dandridge, any state is entitled through economic sanc-
tions to affect a recipient's freedom to procreate if the classification is
rational. 115
The maximum family grant not only affected a recipient's decision
to enlarge his or her family but also affected the parents' right to raise
their own children. In adopting the rational relation test instead of apply-
108. P.A. MAN. § 3776.
109. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
110. Id.
111. Social Security Act, §§ 401, 402(a)(10), 42 U.S.C. §§ 601, 602(a)(10) (1970 & Supp.
1975).
112. The Court reasoned that the maximum grant did not deprive only the younger
children of eligibility but rather the per capita allocation of the family grant was reduced
proportionately.
113. 397 U.S. 471, 480 (1970).
114. The Court articulated the following standard:
In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the
Equal Protection Clause merely because the classification made by its laws are
imperfect. If the classification has some 'reasonable basis,' it does not offend the
Constitution simply because the classification 'is not made with mathematical
nicety or because in the practice it results in some inequality. . . . 'The problems
of government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough
accommodations-illogical, it may be, and unscientific.'
Dandrige v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (citations omitted).
115. But see Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (the right to
procreate was treated as a fundamental right and a compelling state interest was required for
justification).
ing strict scrutiny, the Court refused to recognize a fundamental right
under the first amendment to direct the upbringing of one's children 16 or
a first or ninth amendment right of familial association." 7 Thus, Dan-
dridge seemed to foreclose any extension of the fundamental right doc-
trine into the welfare area.
B. Category of Need
Congress has chosen to differentiate between classes of needy chil-
dren. Only children who have been deprived of parental care for statutori-
ly specified reasons are eligible for AFDC. 1 8 Where AFDC-U1 9 does
not exist, the AFDC program provides incentive for unemployed fathers
to desert their families in order to obtain assistance.' 2 ° If the father
deserts, his child will be eligible by reason of the father's continued
absence.
The assumption of the AFDC "category of need" analysis is that
when there is a healthy breadwinner father in a healthy economy, there
should be no needy children.' 21 This philosophy places an onus on the
father by assuming that if he is neither physically nor mentally ill he could
be out earning enough bread for his family. Under the AFDC-U program
if he is unemployed he is considered to need rehabilitation and aid in
obtaining a job. 122 Under either AFDC or AFDC-U, if he is employed
full-time and still not able to support his family capitalistic charity cannot
cope with his failure.
IV. Conclusion
Government intervention in one's family life is the price exacted
from AFDC recipients. Economically, the government demands the reci-
pient to show how his assistance funds are being used. 23 Socially, the
government insists on behavioral changes as a condition of eligibility.
Both demands are accompanied by persistent and unpleasant government
scrutiny. Although the intent may be absent, the effect is to deter the
recipient from continuing on the public dole, or, at least, to make him
116. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923).
117. Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (freedom of marital association);
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (freedom to associate and privacy in one's
associations).
118. See note 3 supra.
119. AFDC-U enlarges the definition of dependent child to include a needy child who
has been deprived of parental support because of the unemployment of his/her father.
120. Henry v. Betit, 323 F. Supp. 418 (D. Alaska 1971).
121. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 328 (1968).
122. Social Security Act, § 407, 42 U.S.C. § 607 (1970 & Supp. 1975).
123. In Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971), Justice Blackmun analogized public
assistance to private charity:
One who dispenses purely private charity naturally has an interest in and
expects to know how his charitable funds are utilized and put to work. The public,
when it is the provider, rightly expects the same. It might well expect more,
because of the trust aspect of public funds, and the recipient, as well as the
caseworker, has not only an interest but an obligation.
Id. at 319.
suffer if he does. 124 Abuse of the welfare recipient appears to be an
inescapable part of the AFDC program as it is presently administered.
Grants to welfare recipients and administrative safeguards to protect
their privacy and independence must be increased. The extent of govern-
ment interference in the life of the assistance recipient creates a depen-
dency on the government beyond financial dependency. This is ironic in a
program where the stated purpose is to encourage personal independence.
These reforms will come slowly because the government's need to
scrutinize the lives of the welfare recipient will decrease only when our
society abandons its outmoded conception of the "worthy poor" and its
presumption that the failure to earning a living is a result of individual
weakness.
DONNA S. WELDON
124. See generally Handler & Goodstein, The Legislative Development of Public Assist-
ance, 1968 Wis. L. REV. 414 (1968).
